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Abstract 
This paper examines the degree of integration into world financial markets and the 
impacts on several key macroeconomic variables of selected East Asian economies, and 
draws policy implications.  According to our analysis, the degrees of integration into 
world financial markets in those economies are increasing.  Regarding the impacts of 
increasing integration into world financial markets on several macroeconomic variables, 
we find three results.  First, casual two-way plots among macroeconomic variables do 
not support the theoretical prediction of reduction in relative consumption volatility. 
Second, the saving-investment correlation is higher than those of in Euro area 
economies. Third, the degrees of smoothing of idiosyncratic shock by cross-holding of 
financial assets are lower than Euro area economies.    Those results suggest two policy 
implications.  First, there’s some room for improvement in welfare gains in those 
economies by further risk sharing. Second, holding all other conditions given, the 
increasing integration into world financial markets alone is unlikely to provide a sound 
ground for a currency union in East Asia at this stage. 
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Introduction 
The wave of financial liberalization since the mid 1980s facilitated massive capital 
inflows to the Asian economies.  The capital inflows helped those economies to 
take-off, but at the same time were blamed for the subsequent Asian currency and 
banking  crisis.   
Even after the Asian currency and banking crisis, Asian economies have recorded 
remarkable economic growth mainly driven by the region’s growth engine, People’s 
Republic of China (China, hereafter) (see Figure 1) and regional trade integration seems 
to have increased.  As distinct from the pre-crisis period, not only larger economies, 
but also smaller economies record fast growth as the expansion of so-called vertical 
chain of production.  The expansion of vertical chain of production contributes to the 
rising intra-regional trade intensity index in ASEAN and ASEAN+3 economies, despite 
the adverse effects of East Asian financial crisis (see Figure 2). 
The export-led growth in those economies supported by the capital inflows lead to 
massive accumulation of gross foreign assets, especially in the form of foreign reserve, 
and the accumulation of gross foreign liabilities, especially in the form of foreign direct 
investment, as documented by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006a).    The accumulation of 
gross foreign assets and liabilities, and the significance of valuation effects arising from 
exchange rate fluctuations, originally discussed in the context of “original sin,” 
constitute the core issues of global imbalance (See Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2005a and b, 
and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2002 and 2004).     
Motivated with regional trade integration and global imbalance in the world 
financial market, we ask the following questions in  this paper.  First, have the degrees  3
of integration into world financial markets in Asian economies increased or not after the 
Asian currency and banking crisis?    Have Asian economies benefit from the increased 
integration into world financial markets?  Should Asian economies adopt exchange 
rate regimes that are robust to active capital inflows and outflows?   
To answer those questions, we examine the degree of integration into world 
financial markets and its impacts on several key macroeconomic variables, and draw 
policy implications, paying special attention to the emerging market economies in the 
Executives' Meeting of East Asia-Pacific Central Banks (EMEAP)
1 economies.   
In examining its impact, we will employ relatively simple empirical methods in 
reduced forms rather than a fully specified general equilibrium model.  Our approach 
has an advantage to be comparable with the abundant past studies, and to reconcile with 
the lack of the consensus on the general equilibrium model to analyze the issue of 
global imbalance. 
Our analysis shows the following results on the degree of integration into world 
financial markets and its impacts on several key macroeconomic variables.  The 
degrees of integration into world financial markets in EMEAP economies are increasing 
according to our analysis of the new database by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006a).  
Regarding the impacts of increasing integration into world financial markets on several 
macroeconomic variables, we find three results.  First, casual two-way plots among 
macroeconomic variables hardly support the theoretical prediction of reduction in 
relative consumption volatility. Second, the saving-investment correlation is higher than 
                                                  
1  EMEAP, the Executives’ Meeting of East Asia-Pacific Central Banks, is a cooperative organization of 
central banks and monetary authorities in the East Asia and Pacific region.    Its primary objective is to 
strengthen the cooperative relationship among its members.    It comprises the central banks of eleven 
economies: Reserve Bank of Australia, People’s Bank of China, Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Bank 
Indonesia, Bank of Japan, The Bank of Korea, Bank Negara Malaysia, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, Monetary Authority of Singapore, and Bank of Thailand.  4
those of Euro area economies. Third, the degrees of smoothing of idiosyncratic shock 
by cross-holding of financial assets are lower than in Euro area economies.     
Those results suggest two policy implications.  First, there’s some room for 
improvement in welfare gains by further risk sharing in EMEAP economies. Second, 
holding all other conditions given, the increasing integration into world financial 
markets alone is unlikely to provide a sound ground for a currency union in East Asia at 
this stage. 
The organization of this paper is as follows.  Section 1 documents the degree of 
integration into world financial markets by utilizing the foreign assets and liabilities 
data constructed in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006a).  Section 2 presents a series of 
tests to illustrate the effects of integration into world financial markets.  We begin by 
examining several hypotheses that integration into world financial markets would imply 
on key macroeconomic variables such as economic growth and consumption volatilities.   
We then test the saving-investment nexus as claimed by Feldstein-Horioka (1980) to see 
whether the degree of international capital mobility has increased especially after the 
Asian financial crisis.  Further, we test risk-sharing hypothesis as in Asdrubali, 
Sørensen, and Yosha(1996) (hereafter, ASY [1996]) in the international context and 
Asdrubali and Kim (2006) to see whether consumption growth smoothing is taking 
place as integration into world financial markets has been progressing in Asia.  In 
Section 3, we discuss policy implications particularly on exchange rate regime in 
EMEAP economies.    The final section concludes the paper. 
 
1. Integration into World Financial Markets in East Asia   
This section examines trends of integration into world financial markets in the EMEAP  5
economies based on the dataset by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006a).
2  Particular 
attention is paid to “EMEAP8” economies excluding the three high per capita income 
economies, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan.  We compare their trends of 
international integration into world financial markets with those in the euro area 
economies and other advanced economies.  In the following analysis, we refer to euro 
area economies excluding Luxemburg and Slovenia as Euro 11.
3  Our  broadest  sample 
of economies consists of EMPAP economies, Euro 11, Canada, Switzerland, the U.K., 
and the U.S. (See Table 1 for the availability of the data series).   
 
(1) Integration into World Financial Markets 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006a) propose two ways of measuring degree of de-fact 
integration into world financial markets. The first measure is the ratio of the sum of 
external asset and liability divided by GDP (IFIGDP).    The second measure, GDOGDP, 
focuses on portfolio equity and direct investment: 
GDOGDP=(PEQA+FDIA+PEQL+FDIL)/GDP, where PEQA (PEQL) denotes the stock 
of portfolio equity assets (liability) and FDIA (FDIL) denotes the stock of direct 
investment asset (liability).
4   
                                                  
2  Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006a) constructs a consistent series of external assets and liabilities, as well 
as capital inflows and outflows on the basis of residence principle for 145 economies over the period of 
1970-2004.    The data are classified in the following five broad categories: (1) Portfolio investment 
(ownership of shares of companies and mutual funds below 10 percent) subdivided into equity securities 
and debt securities (including bonds and money market instruments), (2) Foreign direct investment 
(equity participations above 10 percent), (3) Other investment (which includes debt instruments such as 
loans, deposits, and trade credits), (4) Financial derivatives (the value of the outstanding derivative’s 
contract), and (5) Reserve assets (foreign exchange, SDR holdings and reserve position in the 
International Monetary Fund). 
3  Data on Luxemburg is available only after 2000, and thus excluded from the following analysis.   
4  Another important way of measuring financial integration is to examine whether the expected return 
from financial assets, such as the real interest rate parity or uncovered interest parity, is shrinking over 
time (For an example on integration between China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, the U.S. and Japan in Cheung, 
Chinn and Fujii (2006)).    We have not examined these measures because domestic financial markets in 
some of the EMEAP economies do not seem sufficiently deep or liquid to allow efficient arbitrage of 
price differentials to take place. See Karolyi and Stulz (2003) for a survey on this issue.  6
Figure3 shows the first measure of integration into world financial markets, 
IFIGDP over the period from 1970 to 2004.  Consistent with Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2006a), IFIGDP accelerated its growth especially around the middle of 1990s across all 
regions.   
Does the increase of integration into world financial markets observed in the 
aggregate EMEAP economies data apply to individual EMEAP economies?  To see 
this point, Table 2 shows the sample average of IFIGDP for each EMEAP economy for 
the period from 1980 to 84, 85 to 89, 90 to 94, and 95 to 99, and 2000 to 2004.    Hong 
Kong S.A.R. of China and Singapore have remarkably high ratios, however, they do not 
alter the overall trend indicating that IFIGDP increased irrespective of an economy’s 
initial degree of integration into world financial markets.     
Figure 4 shows the second measure: GDOGDP over the period from 1970 to 2004.   
The second ratio aims at checking whether the general increase in the degree of 
integration into world financial markets applies to the subgroup of portfolio equity and 
FDI holdings, because the trend observed in the first measure might be driven by special 
factors in international trade in debt instruments.   
The ratio had been stable until 1985, but started to hike in 1985 followed by a 
sharp acceleration beginning in 1996 except for the 2001-2002—replicating the finding 
in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006a) for the industrial countries, developing countries 
and emerging countries.  Again, Hong Kong S.A.R. of China and Singapore have 
remarkably high ratios, however, they do not alter the overall trend.     
We see another measure of capital account openness based on the information on 
controls on financial flows to and from in each economy, namely a de-jure index, 
because the de-facto (e.g. IFIGDP or GDOGDP) and de-jure measures can deviate from  7
each other for several reasons.
5  Indices measuring de-jure integration into world 
financial markets, such as those by Chinn and Ito (2005, data till 2003)
6  and Kose et al. 
(2006, data till 2004), are usually constructed using the disaggregated capital and 
current account restrictions found in annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) published by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF).
7   
Figure 5 shows two measures.  As opposed to the persistent upward trend in the 
de-fact measures, there appeared a reversal in the progress of the current and capital 
account openness in the mid 1990s.  The reversal in de-jure measure probably reflects 
the re-imposition of controls on capital inflows in Indonesia and Malaysia in 1995 and 
96.  The de-fact measure continues to rise because the gross foreign liability 
experienced a dramatic increase due to the revaluation effects during the Asian financial 
crisis even after the re-imposition of the control, while gross foreign asset increased 
somewhat slowly. 
 
(2) Capital Structure   
Given the increasing trend in the degree of integration into world financial markets, 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006a) also show that a measure of capital structure, ratio of 
equity (Portfolio + Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)) liabilities to total financial 
liabilities, has been rising globally.  Figure 6 shows that the ratio for EMEAP8 
economies was quite stable until it started to increase in the 1990s.  In the other 
                                                  
5  For reasons why the two can be different, see Kose et al. (2006). 
6  Their index is the first principle component of the four IMF binary variables on multiple exchange rates, 
capital account, current account, and requirements to surrender export proceeds. For the extension of the 
four binary classifications after 1996, they follow Mody and Murshid (2005).   
7  Kose et al. (2006) uses two financial openness variables. One variable is the financial openness variable 
as defined by Chinn and Ito (2005). The other variable is a binary indicator created by the authors based  8
regions, EMEAP, Euro11 and all sample economies, the ratio declined in during the 
1970s, but turned to an increasing trend in the 1980s followed by the rapid increase in 
the 1990s, consistent with the analysis by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006a).  The 
trends of individual economy shown in Figure 7 are similar to the trend of EMEAP8 
aggregate, although the ratio for China did not drop even in the year 1997 and 1998.  
Regarding the composition of equity share, most of the increase in external liability in 
China was explained by the FDI liabilities, rather than the portfolio equity liability.  
The increase in FDI liabilities has been common to EMEAP economies except for 
Indonesia and Korea where the growth in FDI liability has been slow. 
Behind the increase in equity share in total financial liabilities, we find a downward 
trend in debt liabilities particularly in the 2000s (Figure 8 and Figure 9).
8  However, 
Figure 10 shows that not all EMEAP economies follow the downward trend in debt 
liabilities as in Figure 8  The ratio for Hong Kong S.A.R. of China increased till 1990 
and decreased steadily since then.  The ratio for Singapore increased steadily even in 
the 1990s.    For China, the ratio has been almost constant after 1990.    The ratio for the 
crisis-hit economies, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand, shows a similar trend 
observed in Figure 8 while the spike is recorded in Thailand in 1998. 
A notable change in the composition of the gross foreign asset is the rapid increase 
in official reserves in Asian economies, as can be seen in Figure 8.  We view the rapid 
increase as a region-wide phenomenon in EMEAP8 economies.  Table 3 shows the 
sample average of the ratio of reserve to GDP for each EMEAP8 economy for the 
period from 1980 to 84, 85 to 89, 90 to 94, 95 to 99, and 2000 to 2004.  Hong Kong 
                                                                                                                                                  
on data from the AREAER line E2, which signifies”restrictions on payments for capital transactions.” 
8  Limitation of the data reported in the International Financial Statistics forces us to take the sample 
periods from 1982 to 2004 for EMEAP8 economies minus Hong Kong S.A.R. of China, and 1998 to 
2004 for EMEAP8 economies in Figure 9.  9
S.A.R. of China and Singapore have relatively high ratios, however, they do not alter 
the  overall  trend.   
Regarding the net foreign asset position, it is well known that the U.S. net external 
position has been deteriorated while that of emerging economies has been improving 
(Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006a), Figure 7).    Figure 11 shows that the recovery of the 
net foreign asset position applies to EMEAP economies.    Hong Kong S.A.R. of China, 
Japan and Singapore remain net creditors after 1995, and China became a net creditor 
after 2003.    While improving the net asset positions, the other EMEAP8 economies are 
still net debtors.   
 
(3) Summary 
In sum, EMEAP economies are more open to international financial markets, though the 
composition of assets and liabilities varies from economy to economy.     
We summarize the analyses of external assets and liabilities as follows.    First, our 
measure of de-fact integration into world financial markets, IFIGDP (the ratio for the 
sum of external asset and liability divided by GDP), indicates that the integration has 
been progressing in the last 35 years, and this trend is especially strong after the middle 
of the 1990s. Second, on liabilities side, share of equity (Portfolio + FDI) liabilities in 
total financial liabilities has been rising for some of the EMEAP economies except for 
the years 1997 and 1998.  Third, the ratio of gross external debt to GDP varies from 
economy to economy.  The average trend of EMEAP economies is close to that of 
crisis-hit economies, however. 
 
2. Integration into World Financial Markets and Risk Sharing    10
(1) Integration into World Financial Markets, Growth, and Consumption 
Neoclassical economics predicts that integration into world financial markets would 
have certain effects on macroeconomic variables.  First, in a one sector Solow type 
growth model, integration into world financial markets leads to flows of capital from 
capital-rich economies to capital-poor economies and in the long run the steady state 
output per capita and return to the capital will be equalized.  If the inflow of new 
technology accompanies the inflow of capital, that technology would help the capital 
poor economies grow faster.
9  Second, the effects of integration into world financial 
markets on output volatility are unclear because it has two offsetting effects on the 
country specific shocks and industry specific shocks depending on the stage of 
economic development.  Namely, integration into world financial markets allows 
capital-poor economies in early stage of economic development, for example 
specialized in agricultural production and susceptive to weather shock, to diversify their 
narrow production basis.  In the later stage of economic development, the integration 
into world financial markets and trade integration could simultaneously allow 
economies to specialize in particular industries according to their comparative 
advantages and makes those economies more susceptible to industry specific shocks. 
Third, integration into world financial markets should unambiguously lead to reductions 
in the relative volatility of consumption because it allows risk-averse consumers in an 
economy to smooth the effects from idiosyncratic fluctuations in income growth on 
consumption  growth.   
Figure 12 to Figure 15 plot our integration into world financial markets 
measure, IFIGDP against four macroeconomic variables of our interest.  Figure 12 
                                                  
9  Past studies, however, report that the welfare gain by receiving capital inflows is minimal. See 
Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) for example.  11
plots average growth rate of real GDP and average IFIGDP from 1980 to 2004.  
Among EMEAP8 economies, we do not see clear positive correlation between the two 
variables, which is consistent with those reported in Kose et al. (2006) and also with the 
vast empirical literature providing little robust evidence of a causal relationship between 
integration into world financial markets and growth.  In Figure 13 to Figure 15, the 
three variables, GDP volatility, consumption growth, and consumption volatility show 
negative relationships at first sight, but those relationships become unclear when 
excluding two very open economies, Hong Kong S.A.R. and Singapore.  The results 




(2) Saving and Investment Correlation based on Feldstein and Horioka (1980)   
In this section, we test whether the saving investment correlation increased or decreased 
before and after the Asian Crisis using the methods proposed by Feldstein-Horioka 
(1980). General finding in the literature is that the saving investment correlation falls as 
capital mobility increases (See recent review and results including Asian economies 
Kim, Kim and Wang (2006b)).
11  
Using the statistics from OECD and Asian Development Bank, we construct data 
series for the ratio of gross domestic saving to GDP (hereafter S/Y) and the ratio of 
gross domestic capital formation to GDP (hereafter I/Y).
12   We show unconditional 
                                                  
10  Figure 12 to 15 use data from 1980 to 2004 except for Hong Kong S.A.R. where data starts in 1981, 
and Thailand and Malaysia where 2004 consumption is missing. 
11  Feldstein (2005a) argues that the drops in the saving investment correlation after mid 1990s apply to 
smaller OECD economies, but not for large economies.    When observations are weighted by each 
country GDP, saving-investment correlation remains. 
12  Gross domestic savings are calculated as the difference between GDP and total consumption, where 
total consumption is the sum of private consumption and government consumption.  Gross capital 
formation is the total value of gross fixed capital formation, changes in inventories and acquisitions less  12
means of S/Y and I/Y in Table 4 for three periods: 1981-2004, 1981-1996, and 
2000-2004, which shows large drops in I/Y in the period of 2000-2004 compared with 
the period 1981-1996 in EMEAP8 and EMEAP economies.  One notable exception  to 
this trend is China, whose investment rate does not fall in the period of 2000-2004.     
How should we interpret the significant drops of I/Y in the period of 2000-2004 that 
are not unique to East Asia?    Prasad et al. (2006) speculate that the post-crisis increase 
in savings and reduction in investment in many emerging market economies are a 
response of countries with weak financial systems to productivity shocks in the US.  
The rise in the U.S. productivity accompanied by the reorganization of global 
production mechanism and the global supply chain and trade has been transmitted to 
emerging market economies and raised their income.    But the weak financial sector in 
emerging markets does not intermediate additional domestic savings to domestic 
investment.  
Armed with the annual time-series data for saving and investment from 1981 to 
2004, we derive a between estimator of saving-investment correlation proposed by 
Feldstein and Horioka (1980), hereafter 
^
b , which is an estimator for equation (1) : 
 






















where the subscript t denotes the period, subscript i denote country, and u is an error 
term.    We divide the sample into three periods: 1981-2004, 1981-1996, and 2000-2004.   
Table 5 summarizes the results.     
First row of Table 5 shows the results for EMAP8 economies.  The saving 
investment correlation decreases after the Asian financial crisis, and the statistical 
significance becomes weak.    The second and third rows of Table 5 show the results for 
                                                                                                                                                  
disposals of valuables.    13
EMEAP economies and all economies in our sample.    We confirm the reductions in the 
estimates of saving and investment correlations after the East Asian crisis.    The fourth 
row of Table 5 shows for Euro 11 economies, we see no significant saving and 
investment correlation, but the coefficients take negative values for whole sample 
periods and sub-sample from 2000 to 2004. 
For the sake of robustness check, we choose five-year window beginning in 1981 to 
run rolling regressions for EMEAP8 economies, EMEAP economies and all economies.   
The results are summarized in Figure 16.  The figure shows that the saving and 
investment correlations and their lower bound of confidence intervals—the estimates of 
the coefficients minus 1.96 standard errors.  The saving and investment correlations 
started falling around 1993 and the lower bounds became even negative around the end 
of 1990s.  These results show that the method of Feldstein and Horioka (1980) 
suggests the increase in the degrees of integration into world financial markets in the 
EMEAP economies after the Asian financial crisis, or the period between 2000 and 
2004.  However, it is important to note that this period corresponds to large drops in 
I/Y relative to S/Y in some EMEAP8 economies, which contradict the theoretical 
prediction that greater integration into world financial markets leads to capital flowing 
from capital-rich economies to capital-poor economies. 
 
(3) Risk sharing   
Integration into world financial markets allows economies to share their idiosyncratic 
risks in consumptions and improves welfare.    Empirical investigations on this point are 
abundant both for international and intranational risk sharing.  Kalemli-Ozcan, 
Sørensen, and Yosha (2003) finds, for example, the fraction of idiosyncratic shock  14
smoothed by cross-holding of financial assets (ex ante insurance) in the Euro area are 
9% for the period between 1993 and 2000—a significant increase from small and/or 
almost negative estimates for the preceding years—possibly due to the creation of Euro 
area.  The  general  findings  in the literature are scarce international risk sharing, where 
home bias in asset holdings is prevalent and consumption smoothing takes place 
essentially through domestic saving, and richer intranational risk sharing, where the role 
of capital markets sometimes became preponderant. 
Motivated by the evidence of increasing integration into world financial markets for 
the EMEAP economies in the previous sections, we examine whether consumption risk 
sharing has improved in the region.  We examine the extent of risk sharing through 
two methods; the method by ASY (1996) in the international context and the method by 
Asdrubali and Kim (2006). 
 
A. Decomposition of cross-sectional variance in gross product of an economy 
ASY (1996) proposes the decomposition of cross-sectional variance in gross product 
of an economy (originally applied to that of U.S. states) into four parts: fractions of 
shocks to gross state product smoothed via capital markets, fractions of shocks to gross 
state product smoothed by the federal fiscal system, fractions of shocks to gross state 
product smoothed by credit markets, and an unsmoothed residual fraction.  Sørensen 
and Yosha (1998) advanced ASY (1996) to an international setting and analyzed 
consumption smoothing among EC and OECD economies during the period from 1996 
to 1990.  They find that the contribution of cross-economy factor income flows to  15
cross-economy risk sharing among EC as well as OECD economies is not significantly 
different from zero.
13 
For an application of Sørensen and Yosha (1998) to Asian economies, Kim, 
Kim, and Wang (KKW, 2006a) among others report that credit market channel is more 
important than that of international capital market.  For the sample of 10 Asian 
economies from 1970 to 2000, they find that about 20% of the shocks to income is 
smoothed through the credit market channel while almost no smoothing takes place 
through the international capital market leaving the rest unsmoothed.  We first extend 
their analysis to EMEAP economies including more recent data to see whether this ex 
ante insurance via asset markets is in fact insignificant.     
Following Sørensen and Yosha (1998), suppose that GDP for each economy is 
a homogeneous tradable good and an exogenous random variable.  Suppose further 
that the representative consumer in each economy is an identical risk averse expected 
utility maximizer who obtains utility from consumption.    If the utility function is in log 
form, under full risk sharing, consumption of each economy commoves with world 
consumption, but does not commove with economy specific GDP shock.     
Suppose there is an international capital market and a citizen in one economy 
can own claims to GDP in the other economies, say, through stock holding, and the 
cross-economy factor income flow can smooth the income of citizen in the lending 
economy.    In that case, under full risk sharing, GNP of the lending economy commove 
with the world consumption.  Even if the risk is not fully shared through 
cross-economy factor income flows, suppose there is a credit market.  Then, a citizen 
can smooth consumption via savings and dissavings using the credit market, say 
                                                  
13  See also Mélitz (2004) for a useful survey of the literature, especially regarding evidence from 
European economies.  16
through bank deposit and under full risk sharing, consumption of each economy 
commoves with world consumption.  We consider the consumption allocation under 
full risk sharing as a benchmark, and measure the fraction of shocks to GDP absorbed 
by the international capital market channel and credit market channel through the 
variance decomposition explained below. 
We consider the GDP identity for any period t.  Shocks to GDP are 












GDP =  
 
(2)  
where all the magnitudes are in per capita terms, and i is an index of the economies.
14  
Following KKW(2006a), equation (2) can be transformed to estimate the following 
panel equation system (3) with seemingly unrelated regression (SUR). 
  kt i t i k kt t i t i e GDP g d GNP GDP , , , , log log log + Δ + = Δ − Δ  
ct i t i c ct t i t i e GDP g d C GNP , , , , log log log + Δ + = Δ − Δ  





We interpret the degree of overall income and consumption smoothing against 
idiosyncratic regional shock to GDP of economy i as measured by three sources: first, 
the fraction of idiosyncratic shock smoothed by cross-holding of financial assets (ex 
ante insurance) measured by gk; second, the fraction of idiosyncratic shock smoothed by 
the changes in savings and dissavings typically instigated by the credit markets after the 
realization of idiosyncratic shock, measured by gc; third, the fraction of idiosyncratic 
shock unsmoothed (namely, deviation of international consumption patterns from the 
full risk sharing allocation) measured by gu and  1 = + + u c k g g g .
15 
                                                  
14  We ignore the role of international government transfer in the following analysis following 
KKW(2006a). 
15  Note that the last equation of equation (3) is almost the same as Cochrane’s (1991) empirical model, 
which measures whether the consumption of economies responds only to aggregate shocks or not. The  17
Regarding the first source, if full risk sharing is achieved through international 
capital market channel, GNP of the economy commoves with the world consumption 
and GDP is orthogonal to GDP of that economy.    In this case, we get gk  =1.   
Regarding the second source, if full risk sharing is achieved through the 
combination of international capital market and credit markets, consumption of each 
economy commove with world consumption.    In this case gc measures the incremental 
fraction of shocks to GDP smoothed via savings and we get  0 , 1 = = + u c k g g g .   
Time fixed effects in equation (3),  ut ct kt d d d , , , play crucial role to capture the year 
specific effects on GDP growth rate, presumably the aggregate shocks to GDP of each 
economy. 
The first row of Table 6 shows the result for the period between 1981 and 2004. 
The credit market plays a larger role in smoothing shocks to GDP in EMEAP8 countries 
with more than 30% (the estimate of gc) while only about 6% of the shock to GDP is 
smoothed through international capital market (the estimate of gk).  Moreover, the 
larger values of standard errors for the parameter reported for the estimate of gk suggests 
that the smoothing effect from the international capital market is weak.
16  This 
trend—credit market being more important in Asia— is consistent with the finding by 
KKW (2006a) and Jeon, Oh, and Yang (2005).
17 
Meanwhile, this trend is somewhat weak for ten Euro area economies for the 
same period.  As the second row of Table 6 shows, about 24% is smoothed via credit 
                                                                                                                                                  
focus here is the measurement of fraction of region-specific GDP shocks absorbed through the various 
channels of international insurance. 
16  Our national account and population data is taken from IFS while the purchasing power parity are from 
Penn World Table.    We should better use GNP statistics that include the cross-economy factor income 
flow from the economies under consideration alone to be consistent with the theoretical model, but the 
data limitation does not allow us to do such analysis.   
17  Each of the smoothed portion in their estimate is about half those of ours mainly due to the difference 
in the deflator used and partly to the difference in the countries included.  18
market while 16%, more than double that of EMEAP8, goes through international 
capital market although the larger value of standard error for the parameters prevents us 
taking the results in their face values.
18  One might claim that Asian economies are 
financially integrated more with the U.S. and Euro area rather than the economies in the 
region, and these financial centers should be included in the estimation.  The results 
for risk sharing among EMEAP (all 11 economies), the U.S., and Euro area combined 
are quite similar to the results based on EMEAP8 economies. 
Figure 17 shows the results of estimation of equation (3) using ten-year 
sub-samples.  Figure 17 shows that the fraction smoothed through credit market channel 
peaked during the window of 1983-92 when major financial deregulation, particularly 
in their banking sectors, took place in Asia.    Meanwhile, the fraction smoothed through 
international capital market has been close to zero, and even experienced a sharp drop to 
negative from the mid-80s to early 90s windows.  The drops in the ten-year 
sub-samples beginning from 1988 may be partly due to the Asian crisis with the 
reversals of international capital inflows.  However, toward the end of the sample, the 
smoothed fraction experienced a dramatic increase reaching above 30% of the total 
shocks to GDP possibly driven by a surge in international capital inflows to the region. 
Figure 18 reports the result using all sample economies including EMEAP, 
Euro area, and the U.S.  The result is similar to the result in Figure 17 based on 
EMEAP8 economies.    This result seems to be consistent with the finding by Kim, Lee, 
and Shin (2005), arguing that Asian region is more integrated with global markets than 
with each other.  It may be fair to say, then, that what is developing in the region 
reflects what is happening in the global market.  These findings further confirm those 
                                                  
18  See also Sørensen, and Yosha (1998), though for a different sample period.  19
found in the past literature—credit market channel is more important than that of 
international capital market, and the degree of risk sharing among EMEAP8 is far from 
complete, because the unsmoothed part of consumption against the idiosyncratic shock 
is around 60% on average according to our results. 
 
B. Intertemporal Smoothing based on Asdrubali and Kim (2006) 
Asdrubali and Kim (2004) argue that for some smoothing channels, dynamics of 
smoothing is much richer than the impact estimates captured in the simple static model 
as in the subsection A.  Those channels include smoothing via tax/transfer system 
and/or via credit channels.  Given consistently high, around 40%, shocks smoothed 
through credit market in the EMEAP economies, we suspect that intertemporal 
smoothing may be worth an attention.  Motivated by those arguments, we gauge the 
cross-sectional smoothing from different perspective from KSY (2003), and measure 
intertemporal smoothing in EMEAP8 based on an imperfect risk sharing framework as 
proposed by Asdrubali and Kim (2006).     
First, Asdrubali and Kim (2006) propose a way to measure risk sharing, taking 
into account time heterogeneity by modeling the time effect term as random, and 
correlated with aggregate output growth, which is approximated by average domestic 
output growth of economies under consideration.  Specifically,  they  estimate  the 
following equation (4): 
 
t i t t i t t i GDP GDP u C , , , log log log ε α β + Δ + Δ + = Δ ,  (4) 
 
where  ∑Δ = Δ
i
t i t GDP GDP , log log  and  0 ] log | ) [( , = Δ + GDP u E t i t ε . According to 
their model, the coefficient β , attached to domestic output growth, measures the 
deviation from the risk sharing arrangement, and the orthogonal coefficientα , attached  20
to aggregate output growth, measures the extent of risk sharing within the group of 
economies under consideration.  The innovation in the method of Asdrubali and Kim 
(2006) lies in the identification of the extent of risk sharing from aggregate output 
growth (the coefficientα ), rather than individual economy’s output growth as in KSY 
(2003) (the third equation of Equation (3)).     
  Table 7 reports the results for estimation of equation (4) using the data on 
EMEAP8 economies for whole sample periods from 1971 to 2005 and for decades.
19  
The estimates of  β   suggest that about 40% of idiosyncratic income growth shocks are 
insured on average during the last four decades.    As for the degree of international risk 
sharing which is explicitly captured by α , there seem to be an increasing trend in 
international risk sharing toward the recent years as regional financial integration 
progresses.  However, the magnitude of international risk sharing is limited, around 
3% in contrast to 21% as found for OECD countries by Asdrubali and Kim (2006). 
Second, Asdrubali and Kim (2006) propose a way to measure the intertemporal 
smoothing effects by estimating the following equation (5): 
 
t i i t i i t i GDP GDP C , , , log log log υ δ γ ς + Δ + Δ + = Δ   (5) 
 
where  i GDP log Δ  is the time average of output. The coefficientγ , attached to 
domestic output growth, measures the extent of consumption smoothing out of 
temporary income growth.  Suppose that permanent output growth for an economy is 
approximated by the time average output growth of that economy, and suppose further 
that individual heterogeneity is correlated with the time average output growth.    Then, 
the orthogonal coefficientδ , attached to the time average of output growth can be 
interpreted as consumption smoothing out of permanent output growth. 
                                                  
19  All variables in the regressions are real in domestic currency and in per capita term.  21
  Table 8 report the estimation results of equation (5) for whole sample period 
from 1971 to 2004, and sub-sample periods before, during and after the Asian crisis: 
1971 to 1996, 1998 to 2000, and 2000 to 2004.    The results in the first row suggest that 
while about 40% of temporary shock is smoothed overtime, only 28% of permanent 
shock is smoothed, in the sense that country consumption growth follows less than a 
third of a measurement of permanent income growth on average.
20   
One might expect that the EMEAP economies had experienced more difficulty 
in using both short-term and long-term borrowings to smooth domestic consumption 
during the Asian financial and banking crisis.  However, the estimates based on the 
data after the crisis period from 2001 to 2005 show that both channels appear improved 
dramatically.    As the last row of   Table 8 shows, more than 50% of temporary shock is 
smoothed overtime, and close to half of the permanent shock is smoothed. 
  Overall, the results based on equation (5), with explicit intertemporal factor, are 
strikingly similar to the results obtained from the sample of OECD economies 
(Asdrubali and Kim, [2006]).  However, the results based on equation (4), using 
aggregate income growth to measure the extent of cross-sectional risk sharing, show 
small extent of risk sharing compared with the results base on the data on advanced 
economies.  We interpret the results that international risk sharing in EMEAP 
economies is still limited, although the intertemporal smoothing in EMEAP economies 
may be comparable to the one in the developed countries. 
 
(4) Summary   
The analyses in section 2 provide us with supporting evidence for integration into world 
                                                  
20  Again, note that we assume that permanent output growth for an economy is approximated by the 
average output growth of that economy in estimating equation (5).  22
financial markets, and limited progress in risk sharing within EMEAP economies than 
the economic theory suggests.
21    Specifically,  casual  two-way plots between 
integration into world financial markets and several macroeconomic variables do not 
support the prediction of reduction in relative consumption volatility. Testing the 
saving-investment correlation proposed by Feldstein and Horioka (1980) suggests a 
significant increase in the degree of international capital mobility in the EMEAP 
economies during the years after the Asian financial crisis, but the saving-investment 
correlation in EMEAP economies is higher than that in euro area economies.  As for 
the risk sharing, the degree of intertemporal smoothing may be comparable to the one in 
the OECD countries, but the international risk sharing is limited. 
Why the increased integration into world financial markets does not lead to 
clear-cut empirical evidence for better risk sharing and improvement of welfare in the 
EMEAP economies?  One answer to this question is the endogeniety of the quality of 
institutions, known as “collateral benefits,” and integration into world financial markets.     
“Collateral benefits,” proposed by Kose et al. (2006), consists of a broad set of 
economic fundamentals that provides the benefit of integration into world financial 
markets in addition to the traditional channels (e.g., capital accumulation).  The 
collateral benefits could include development of the domestic financial sector, 
improvements in institutions, better macroeconomic policies, etc., which then result in 
                                                  
21  This main message—that global integration progresses, whereas regional integration remains 
weak—appears a robust one, as it is supported by other studies on financial integration using different 
integration measures, with a few exceptions.    For example, Forbes and Chinn (2004) find that stock 
returns have quantitatively important impacts on five major Asian economies, and the significant impacts 
result from the direct trade linkage.    Eichengreen and Park (2003) use a gravity model to explain the 
patterns of consolidated international bank claims reported to BIS that shows slower financial integration 
in Asia.    In contrast, Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2006) use a gravity model to explain the 
patterns of bilateral international portfolio holding measured by the IMF for 2001 to 2003. They find that 
the Asian bond markets are more integrated than a randomly selected pair of bond markets, holding other 
determinants of the bilateral international portfolio constant.  23
higher growth, usually through gains in allocative efficiency. 
EMEAP economies have a long way to go to obtain those collateral benefits.    For 
example, compared with euro area economies, EMAEP economies so far do not have 
deep and liquid regional capital market, regional international institutions, and regional 
common economic policies.  Compared with selected developing economies a 
composite opacity index presented in Gelos and Wei (2005) indicates that the degree of 
opacity in areas such as accounting standards, macroeconomic policies, and legal 
system of average EMEAP economies is below the average of 30 developing economies 
when excluding Singapore and Hong Kong S.A.R..
22   
We argue that the integration into world financial markets in EMEAP economies 
has progressed, but is not deep and lasted long enough to establish the collateral benefits.   
Hence we find it difficult to recover the associated macroeconomic gains from the 
increasing degree of integration into world financial markets through our econometric 
analysis. 
Do we learn any implications for the future of currency union in Asian 
economies?  Our empirical results suggest that an ample room remains for 
improvement in intraregional risk sharing and welfare in Asia.
23  Specifically 
compared with the Euro area economies, we find the higher saving-investment 
                                                  
22  The data is originally constructed by PricewaterhouseCoopers. The index is presented for only 6 
economies; Hong Kong S.A.R., Indonesia. Korea, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.    See details in 
Table AII, column 2 of Gelos and Wei (2005). 
23  Note that the integration into world financial markets is only one of the many important conditions for 
a currency union, such as the flexibility of labor market and international transfer system to cope with 
economy-specific shock. Moreover, Asian economies do not have common strong political leadership 
toward a currency union compared with European economies.  The lack of clear regional leadership 
leads to some economists wonders if China or Japan would really participate into the union, if ever 
created.  For example, Fischer (2006) expects that the non-Chinese members would like to have a 
common currency so as to have some impact on region-wide monetary policy, but whether China would 
grant that role would be up to China.  Fischer also expects that Japan plays an independent role by 
retaining its currency, rather like the United Kingdom currently does in Europe.  24
correlation, the lower degrees of the fraction of idiosyncratic shock smoothed by 
cross-holding of financial assets and a limited extent of risk sharing within EMEAP8 
economies.    Given the lack of area-wide alternative mechanisms to cope with economy 
specific shocks, such as coordinated fiscal policy and measures to make labor market 
flexible, our evidence against the consumption smoothing mechanism via international 
capital market and a credit market in Asia suggests that it is unlikely that a currency 
union in Asia is a feasible solution because a currency union takes away an important 
adjustment mechanism against idiosyncratic shock, namely the adjustment of the 
bilateral nominal exchange rate.   
 
3. Implications of Integration into World Financial Markets on Exchange Rate 
Regimes in Asia 
The analyses in section 2 raise an important question surrounding exchange rate 
fluctuations and regimes; what is the appropriate exchange rate regime when capital 
account is open?  This section reviews selected literatures in searching for possible 
answers to the question.
24 
Motivated with the Asian currency and banking crisis, influential economists 
argue that increasing integration into world financial markets suggests that the 
appropriate exchange rate regime is either flexible exchange rate or a fixed exchange 
                                                  
24  One of the other important topics about integration into world financial markets and exchange rate is 
so called valuation channel.  As summarized by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006b), even if net external 
balance is zero, economies are exposed to asset price movements including exchange rates.    The effects 
of asset price changes would differ from economy to economy depending on the composition of assets 
and liabilities—reflecting the wedge between domestic and foreign real returns.  Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti (2005a) provides numerical examples on the effects through valuation channel for 
Indonesia and Malaysia.  The two economies track a similar trend—net capital gains and the valuation 
effects through exchange rate fluctuations are fairly big and negative offsetting the positive gains in trade 
balance for the period from 1990 to 2002.  However, the estimates of total quantitative magnitude of 
valuation channel in emerging market economies were not available so far due to the lack of precise 
historical data for this purpose.  25
rate supported, if necessary, by a commitment to give up altogether an independent 
monetary policy (For example, Summers [2000] and  Fischer [2001]).  Although the 
crisis in Argentina showed the difficulty of implementing the hard-peg exchange rate 
regime, as Obstfeld (2004) observes, majority of emerging market economies appear to 
be practicing extensive smoothing of exchange rate, though to a lesser extent as 
compared to the pre-crisis period, and also to allow longer-term trends to accommodate 
trade competitiveness. Obstfeld (2004) states that it is difficult for those emerging 
market economies to embrace floating U.S. dollar exchange rates due to the fact that the 
contractual unit of account being a foreign currency, often U.S/ dollar, leading to 
dollarized liabilities and/or a lack of deep and resilient financial markets.     
Kose et al. (2006) argues that for economies with weak financial systems, an open 
capital account and a fixed exchange rate regime are not an auspicious combination.   
In this context, “Managed floating plus” position for larger emerging market economies, 
recommended by Goldstein (2002) makes sense.  “Managed floating plus” means the 
combination of inflation targeting and aggressive measures to reduce currency 
mismatches in assets and liabilities. Goldstein proposes a variety of measures to limit 
currency mismatches; these include a periodic announcement of the ratio of short-term 
foreign debt to foreign reserves, a development of deeper capital markets that allow 
better hedging mechanism and a prohibition against government borrowing in foreign 
currencies.   
Consistent with the argument of Kose et al. (2006) and Goldstein (2002), there is a 
line of literature that supports floating exchange rate regime under strong balance sheet 
effects due to financial imperfection, rather than fixed exchange rate regime.  First, 
Céspedes, Chang, and Velasco (2004) show that in spite of financial imperfections and  26
balance sheet effects, flexible exchange rates do play a useful insulating role against real 
external shocks even with foreign denominated borrowing from the world capital 
market. Consider an unanticipated shock to the world interest rate.  The shock always 
calls for a real devaluation, which can increase the burden of inherited dollarized debt, 
worsen the net worth, and push up the risk premium.  Meanwhile, this negative effect 
would be offset partially by positive effects on the asset side through increases in 
demand for domestic goods, which lead to hikes in both output and the return earned by 
entrepreneurs.    According to their specification, under a floating exchange rate regime, 
where the central bank targets the price of home output, the necessary real devaluation 
is accomplished by a nominal depreciation, which leaves the product real wage and 
hence current employment unchanged, but decreases investment and future output.  
Under fixed exchange rate regime, the necessary real devaluation is accomplished by 
deflation, which increases the product real wage and causes a fall in current 
employment and current output.    The fall in current output decreases net worth, pushes 
up the risk premium further, and decreases investment and future output to a greater 
degree than the case of a flexible exchange rate regime.  In their model, the floating 
exchange rate regime provides higher welfare than the fixed exchange rate regime 
does.
25 
Another important contribution is by Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci (2006), 
which supports the floating exchange rate regime with foreign currency denominated 
debt.  They consider a small open economy macroeconomic model to capture the key 
                                                  
25  While their model does not allow for sluggish price-level dynamics, the fact that price deflation tends 
to be slow and more predictable than currency depreciation (especially in a crisis setting) in reality would 
alleviate the increases in the burden of inherited dollarized debt under a fixed exchange rate regime.   
The moderate increase in the burden of inherited dollarized debt might be comparable to the benefit of 
output stabilization arising under the flexible exchange rate regime.    See Devereux and Lane (2003) for 
an exposition of this case.  27
feature of Korean experience 1997-98, where money and nominal price rigidities are 
extended to show a link between exchange rate regimes and financial distress based on 
the financial accelerator mechanism.  In response to an exogenous rise in the country 
risk premium, their model shows a sharp increase in lending rates and large drop in 
output, employment, investment and measured productivity.  According to their 
calibration to match their model to Korean experience 1997-98, the financial accelerator 
mechanism explains a half of the economic downturn.     
Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci (2006) compare the performance of fixed 
exchange rate regime, floating exchange rate regime with Taylor rule, and fixed 
exchange rate regime later abandons in favor of floating exchange rate regime using 
simulations.  The simulations show that a credible floating exchange rate regime is 
better than a fixed exchange rate regime.  While domestic interest rate is tied to the 
foreign interest rate under the fixed exchange rate regime, under floating exchange rate 
regime, the domestic interest rate is governed by a feed back rule like a Taylor-rule.  
Hence, an increase in the country risk premium under floating exchange rate shows 
immediate depreciation of currency, prompt increase in exports and a sharp rise in CPI 
inflation.   Rising nominal interest rate in response to CPI inflation reduces investment 
demand, but it is partly offset by the increasing exports.  With foreign currency 
denominated liabilities, the floating exchange rate becomes less attractive because 
depreciation means reductions of entrepreneurial net worth and enhances financial 
accelerator mechanism, however, floating exchange rate regime is still attractive in a 
sense that the output drop remains smaller under flexible exchange rate regime than 
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fixed exchange rate regime.
26     
Note that the two examples only deal with special cases in tractable 
macroeconomic models, and thus the policy implications of their models should not be 
taken literally.  For example, those examples consider the effects of country specific 
shock to small open economies, and they do not investigate the effects of area-wide 
shock in a currency union, which may be relevant for a hypothetical currency union in 
Asian economies.  Moreover, as Kose et al (2006) summarizes, the literature does not 
imply that the fixed exchange rate regime is necessarily a problem for economies prior 
to international capital market liberalization.  Maintaining either a free float or a hard 
peg along with capital account openness requires a strong commitment to fostering 
good institutions, especially with respect to financial market regulation and supervision. 
Indeed, the Asian economies have generally decided to maintain floating exchange 
rates with some degrees of foreign exchange interventions.   Wyplosz (2006) interprets 
their behavior as they have decided to trade off the benefits from an export-led strategy, 
based on exchange rate stability and external competitiveness, against the probability of 
renewed speculative attacks.    If the probability is low enough, which we do not know, 
the choice is reasonable.  Wyplosz (2006) agrees that accumulating foreign exchange 
reserves is one way of bringing the probability down, but warns that it is easy to 
imagine how a domestic financial distress or a serious political turmoil could precipitate 
a speculative attack on the currency.
27  
                                                  
26  See also Devereux, Land and Xu (2006) and Cúrida (2005) for similar results. 
27  This paper does not deal with the debate over the appropriateness of basket-peg proposal for Asian 
economies, because those papers generally focus on trade integration, rather than integration into world 
financial markets.  We list a few studies on the pros and cons for basket-peg below for reference.  
Kawai (2002) argued that (1) a system which ensures intra-regional exchange rate stability will be 
beneficial for emerging East Asia to promote trade, FDI, and economic growth; (2) given the high degree 
of intra-regional trade and the rising similarity of trade composition in East Asia, each economy’s 
exchange rate policy should be directed toward maintaining intra-regional exchange rate stability (see  29
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
This paper examines the degree of integration into world financial markets and its 
impacts on several key macroeconomic variables for selected East Asian economies, 
and draws policy implications.  According to our analysis, the degrees of integration 
into world financial markets in those economies  are  increasing.  Regarding  the  impacts 
of increasing integration into world financial markets on several macroeconomic 
variables, we find three results.  First, casual two-way plots among macroeconomic 
variables do not support the theoretical prediction of reduction in relative consumption 
volatility. Second, the saving-investment correlation is higher than those of Euro area 
economies. Third, the degrees of smoothing of idiosyncratic shock by cross-holding of 
financial assets are lower than in Euro area economies.  Those results suggest two 
policy implications.  First, there’s some room for improvement in welfare gains in 
those economies by further risk sharing. Second, holding all other conditions given, the 
increasing integration into world financial markets alone is unlikely to provide a sound 
ground for a currency union in East Asia at this stage. 
                                                                                                                                                  
Branson and Healy(2005) for the same argument and see the opposite argument in Sa and Gurin(2006)); 
and (3) The diverse economic linkages of emerging East Asia with the rest of the world suggest that 
exchange rate stabilization vis-à-vis a well-balanced currency basket comprising the dollar, the yen, and 
the euro is a reasonable option. Ogawa and Kawasaki (2006) examine the cointegration relationship 
among real effective exchange rates and find after the East Asian crisis, the Japanese yen becomes one of 
the currencies to be included that stabilizes the other Asian currencies.  They argue that the results 
suggests that the common currency basket arrangement into the ASEAN plus three economies that 
include Japan. Yoshino et al. (2004) provides an example that the choice of exchange rate regime depends 
on the choice of policy objectives, and a basket-peg with trade weight in general is not the best choice.  
Shioji (2006) examines the optimal weight for East Asia’s currency basket peg to the dollar and the yen 
based on a three economy version of new open economy macroeconomics model for Asia, Japan and the 
U.S.  According to his model, the weight of the basket peg depends not only on the trade share that the 
traditional literature of basket peg puts emphasis on, but also on the choice of invoicing currency.    Shioji 
concludes that under the invoicing currency pricing, East Asian economies should assign more weight to 
Japanese yen, rather than the standard assumption of seller’s currency pricing.  The results of Shioji 
(2006) highlight the importance of the understanding on the choice of invoice currency and the degree of 
pass-though in Asia.  See Parsons and Sato (2006) and Ito and Sato (2006) on the degree of 
pass-through.  30
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Table 1 : Country Group and Data availability   





























1 China,P.R.: Mainland ○○ ○ 1980 1980 1981 1981 1981 1981 n.a. n.a. 1977
2 Hong Kong S.A.R. of China ○○ ○ 1979 1979 1979 1979 1979 1979 2000 2000
3 Indonesia ○○ ○ 1979 2002 2002
4 Korea ○○ ○ 2001 2001
5 Malaysia ○○ ○ 2001 2001
6 Philippines ○○ ○ 1980 1980 2001 2001
7 Singapore ○○ ○ 2001 2001
8 Thailand ○○ ○ 2000 2000
9 Australia ○○ 1986 1986
10 New Zealand ○○ 2000 2000
11 Japan ○○ 1995 1995
12 Austria ○○ 1994 1994
13 Belgium ○○ 1995 1995
14 Finland ○○ 1993 1993
15 France ○○ 1994 1994
16 Germany ○○ n.a. n.a.
17 Greece ○○ 1986 2000 2000
18 Ireland ○○ 2001 2001
19 Italy ○○ 2000 2000
20 Netherlands ○○ 1999 1999
21 Portugal ○○ 1972 1972 1996 1996
22 Spain ○○ n.a. n.a.
23 Canada ○ n.a. n.a.
24 Switzerland ○ n.a. n.a.
25 United Kingdom ○ n.a. n.a.
26 United States ○ n.a. n.a.
Group Data sample starting  year (Blank means 1970)
  37
Table 2 : The ratio for the sum of external asset and liability divided by GDP 
(IFIGDP): Five Year Sample Average. 
Period of the data 80-84 85-89 90-94 95-99 00-04
1 China,P.R.: Mainland 0.134 0.230 0.448 0.707 0.932
2 Hong Kong S.A.R. of China 5.035 11.233 13.535 11.883 12.276
3 Indonesia 0.407 0.716 0.836 1.297 1.177
4 Korea 0.663 0.532 0.393 0.737 0.947
5 Malaysia 1.045 1.397 1.493 1.780 2.035
6 Philippines 0.858 1.070 1.045 1.192 1.418
7 Singapore 2.266 3.473 3.634 6.050 9.266
8 Thailand 0.455 0.626 0.865 1.042 1.334
9 Australia 0.452 0.861 1.112 1.453 2.036
10 New Zealand 0.642 1.218 1.514 1.823 2.223
11 Japan 0.386 0.790 0.964 1.042 1.184
EMEAP8  0.624 1.243 1.695 1.930 2.030
EMEAP  0.469 0.905 1.151 1.333 1.535   38
Table 3 : The ratio for the reserve divided by GDP:   
Sample average from 1981 to 90, 1991–2000, 2001–2004. 
 
80—84 85—89 90—94 95—99  00—04 
1  China,P.R.: Mainland  0.035 0.043 0.072 0.143  0.246 
2  Hong Kong S.A.R. of China  0.196 0.275 0.347 0.495  0.706 
3  Indonesia  0.048 0.057 0.070 0.130  0.176 
4  Korea  0.034 0.043 0.053 0.096  0.234 
5  Malaysia  0.144 0.201 0.297 0.297  0.405 
6  Philippines  0.042 0.033 0.071 0.120  0.171 
7  Singapore  0.544 0.704 0.800 0.849  0.952 
8  Thailand  0.045 0.086 0.186 0.226  0.285 
EMEAP8  0.063 0.087 0.135 0.197  0.299  39
 
Table 4 : Unconditional mean of Saving and Investment 
Sample 
Mean(i/y) Mean(s/y) Mean(i/y) Mean(s/y) Mean(i/y) Mean(s/y)
EMEAP8 30.260 33.298 31.982 32.748 25.750 33.988
(s.e.) (7.640 ) (8.778 ) (7.064 ) (8.231 ) (7.182 ) (8.280 )
EMEAP 28.871 30.392 30.319 30.132 25.146 30.600
(s.e.) (7.110 ) (9.389 ) (6.878 ) (8.885 ) (6.223 ) (9.194 )
All 24.851 25.036 25.532 24.738 23.087 25.332
(s.e.) (6.486 ) (8.361 ) (6.825 ) (8.098 ) (5.150 ) (8.358 )
Euro11 22.394 21.281 22.416 20.967 22.324 21.573




Table 5: Saving and Investment Correlation 
Sample 
b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.)
EMEAP8 0.572 0.108 0.674 0.093 0.401 0.289
EMEAP 0.521 0.071 0.625 0.064 0.302 0.183
ALL 0.574 0.071 0.712 0.066 0.264 0.106
Euro11 -0.080 0.438 0.438 0.405 -0.453 0.290
1981-2004 1981-1996 2000-2004
  41
Table 6: Estimation result of equation (3) (1981–2004) 
  gk g c  gu 
EMEAP8  0.062 (0.062)  0.308 (0.124)  0.622 (0.068) 
Euro10  0.160 (0.124)  0.240 (0.128)  0.603 (0.126) 
G7  0.030 (0.111)  0.169 (0.177)  0.801 (0.177) 
EMEAP, the U.S. and Euro10  0.060 (0.051)  0.303 (0.079)  0.636 (0.053) 
Note: Standard errors are in brackets. Euro 10 economies includes 10 countries excluding 
Luxemburg, Greece, and Slovenia.    42
Table 7: Estimation result of equation (4) for EMEAP8 
  Sample   Country  i 
GDP (β ) 
(s.e.) EMEAP8 
aggregate GDP (α )
(s.e.) Wald  test 
( ) 2 (
2 χ ) 
1971–2005 0.591  (0.043)  0.018  (0.009)  272.98 
1970s 0.685  (0.080)  –0.004  (0.017)  84.04 
1980s 0.558  (0.064  0.022  (0.011)  235.37 
1990s 0.653  (0.104)  0.033  (0.014)  207.91 
1991–2005 0.632  (0.083)  0.032  (0.011)  202.18 
Note: The coefficientβ , attached to domestic output growth, measures the effects of risk sharing 
arrangement for idiosyncratic GDP shocks within the economies, and the coefficientα , attached to 
aggregate output growth, measures the extent of risk sharing within the group of economies under 
consideration  43
Table 8: Estimation result of equation (5) for EMEAP8 







( ) 2 (
2 χ ) 
1971–2005 
(Whole sample) 
0.593 (0.033) 0.275 (0.048) 904.66 
1971–1996 
(Before the Crisis) 
0.555 (0.039) 0.279 (0.052) 804.13 
1997–2000 
(During the Crisis)
0.726 (0.119) 0.215 (0.260)  53.83 
2001–2005 
(After the Crisis) 
0.463 (0.101) 0.448 (0.132) 151.08 
Note: The coefficient γ  measures the extent of consumption smoothing out of temporary income 
growth, and the coefficient δ  can be interpreted as consumption smoothing out of permanent output 
growth.   44







































































































































































































































Source: IMF WEO database Gross domestic product, constant prices, annual percent 
change.  45

















































































Source: ADB, Regional integration indicator database.  
Note: An index of more than one indicates that trade flow within the region is larger than expected given 
the importance of the region in world trade.ç The index is defined as the ratio of intra-regional trade 
share to the share of world trade with the region.  The index is calculated using exports data, and 
determines whether trade within the region is greater or smaller than should be expected on the basis of 
the region's importance in world trade.    46
























































































Note: The ratio for the sum of external asset and liability divided by GDP.  47






















































































Note: The ratio for stock of portfolio equity asset and liability and stock of direct investment asset and 
liability divided by GDP.    48









































































































































































Note: De jure measure is the one created in Chinn and Ito (2005).ç De fact measure is IFIGDP proposed 
by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006a).  49
 

























































































Note: Share of equity (Portfolio + FDI) liability in total financial liability.    50



























































































Note: Share of equity (Portfolio + FDI) liability in total financial liability.      51
 


































































































































































































EMEAP8(External Debt/Exports of Goods and Service)
EMEAP8-HK(External Debt/Exports of Goods and Service)
EMEAP8(Reserve/Exports of Goods and Service)
EMEAP8-HK(Reserve/Exports of Goods and Service)
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Figure 12: Integration into world financial markets and GDP growth rate 
y = -0.167x + 3.6848










2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 10.0






























Note: GDP growth rate (Domestic currency, constant price) from IMF WEO database.  56
Figure 13: Integration into world financial markets and GDP volatility 
y = -9.7303x + 6.6239
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Note: Coefficient of variation of GDP (Domestic currency, constant price) from IMF WEO database.    57
 
Figure 14: Integration into world financial markets and Consumption Growth 
y = -1.2336x + 10.689
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Note: Household consumption growth in national currency deflated by CPI. Data is taken from 
International Financial Statistics.      58
Figure 15: Integration into world financial markets and Consumption Volatility 
y = -17.962x + 9.7415
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Note: Coefficient of variation of level of household consumption in national currency deflated by CPI. 
Data is taken from International Financial Statistics.    59
 






















































































































































































































Note: Window of 10 years for EMEAP8.  61
Figure 18: Global: Rolling Estimation result of equation (3) 





















































































































Note: Window of 10 years for Euro area + Asia + U.S. 
 
 